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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that regime legitimacy creates military resilience. A regime is
legitimate when its constituents believe-whether because of ideological solidarity,
patriotism, nationalism, or good governance-that a government has the right to
exercise authority in its regime. Military resilience, which contributes to military
effectiveness, refers to the willingness of troops to stay committed in combat. In
modern war, dispersion of forces creates the need for a very high degree of troop
commitment, making resilience more important than in previous forms of warfare.
Resilient units do not disintegrate through desertion, and furthermore commit
themselves actively under fire.
In arguing that legitimacy matters, this thesis revives a debate between two theories
of military resilience. The first school, which comes out of the tradition of the mass
army, holds that broad attributes like legitimacy, patriotism, and nationalism are
crucial to resilience. In recent political science, a second school has been significantly
more influential; these scholars argue that factors like small-unit cohesion and
professionalism are the key explanatory variables for military resilience. Settling the
debate between these competing methods of generating resilience is critical to
effective army building.
This thesis strongly supports a revival of the first school of thought, based on the
evidence from two cases where legitimacy experienced a sudden shock. The first
case examines the military resilience of foreign legions forced to fight for Nazi
Germany in World War II. It finds that those units were rarely resilient, even given
otherwise similar conditions to German units, and what little resilience existed can
be explained primarily through patriotism to soldiers' original homelands. The
second case examines the Yugoslav People's Army during and after the
disintegration of federated Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The evidence suggests that the
army lacked resilience, experiencing mass desertion, when fighting for a
disintegrated regime. It regained in resilience when it was reconstituted as a
nationalist Serbian army in 1992.
Thesis Supervisor: Barry R. Posen
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
1. Introduction, Literature Review, and Theory
What affects the resilience of an army? Will soldiers fight harder on behalf of a
regime or cause they see as legitimate? Scholars have long recognized that assessing
state power requires incorporating more than quantitative strengths in troop
numbers, materiel, and training. Qualitative attributes matter, too, whether analysts
understand those as "spirit and moral factors," "professionalism," "national morale,"
or something else.' Beyond fears that uncommitted soldiers will run away or
surrender, modern warfare requires commitment in an active sense: the increased
complexity of combat operations, combined with greater degrees of individual
autonomy and force dispersion, require more of the soldier. One analysis, by
Stephen Biddle, finds that measures of material factors, like GNP and population,
can predict only 49% to 62% of war outcomes-victory or defeat-between 1900
and 1992; as Biddle remarks, these independent variables are thus little more
helpful, statistically speaking, than a coin toss. 2 In a similar vein, Von Clausewitz
observes that estimating the amount of military force needed to win a modern war
"leaves the field of the exact sciences of logic and mathematics. It then becomes an
art in the broadest meaning of the term... To master all this complex mass by sheer
methodical examination is obviously impossible. Bonaparte was quite right when he
said that Newton himself would quail before the algebraic problems it would pose."3
1. On moral factors, see Carl Von Clausewitz, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 184-185: "One might say that the
physical [factors] seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the
precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade." On professionalism, see Samuel
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge:
Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 7-97. On national character and morale, see Hans
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1956), pp. 118-128.
2. Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 21.
3. Von Clausewitz, On War, pp. 585-6.
Scholarship remains scattered and divided on what factors, beyond material
power and technology, most explain military effectiveness. In this thesis, I focus on
one potential source of military effectiveness that has been largely neglected by
recent political-science literature: a sense that the regime or cause being fought for is
legitimate.4 This theory holds that a sense of shared purpose creates resilience,
which ultimately contributes to effectiveness. In arguing that ideational factors
matter, I move away from a genre of accounts, common since World War II, that
has stressed small-unit cohesion as the primary source of military resilience.5 Those
theories argue that soldiers stay focused in battle because they have come to care
about the soldiers in the trenches around them, their "primary group"; their loyalty
and enthusiasm is owed less to the regime or the cause than to their fellow
infantryman.6 The two explanations are not mutually exclusive, to be sure; a sense
of national unity, obtained through legitimacy, may help military trainers induce the
necessary camaraderie.7
However, the divide between these two explanations has run deep in political
4. Drawing on Seymour Martin Lipset and other political theorists, legitimacy here refers to the
belief by a population that a government has a right to exercise control over its regime.
Legitimacy can be obtained and enhanced through nationalism, patriotism, shared ideology,
and other factors, as well as by good governance. Causal legitimacy creates regime legitimacy by
creating the sense that the military is being employed for an appropriate purpose.
5. I return to the distinction between military resilience and military effectiveness later, but
briefly, military resilience refers to soldiers' commitment in battle, which affects-along with
many other attributes--military effectiveness. Military effectiveness and military success should
also be differentiated; an effective military can lose in battle to a less effective military because
of bad conditions, bad luck, or bad balance of forces.
6. The idea came to popularity after a seminal study of Wehrmacht units' ability to stay effective
even when outgunned. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in
the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1948), pp.
280-315.
7. Shils and Janowitz admit that patriotism and its "secondary symbols" can help form the
primary groups that motivate soldiers, op. cit., pp. 300-306. Summarizing the literature on
small-unit cohesion, Alexander George distinguishes between armies like the Chinese Peoples
Liberation Army and the Soviet Army where "comradely ties...were often grounded in
patriotism," by contrast to "informal ties that cement small groups within the U.S. Army" that
are "overtly apolitical or even antipolitical, and largely unregulated by higher authorities."
Alexander L. George, "Primary Groups, Organization, and Military Performance," in Handbook
of Military Institutions, ed. Roger W. Little (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp.
301-2 and 304.
science. The debate pits two fundamentally different methods of obtaining soldiers'
cooperation-two distinct views of how to stand up a military-against each other.
The first school sees such motivation as most readily obtained through purveying a
set of of "wholesale" factors, like nationalism, religion, ideology, or patriotism, that
can be used to mobilize and motivate a mass army quickly and on the cheap. The
second school, which has dominated the last half-century of political science
research, favors what might be called "retail" factors.8 These include small-unit
cohesion and professionalism; instilling these attributes may be more costly and
time-consuming on a per soldier basis than the wholesale method, and can result in
significantly smaller militaries. Such factors are also less likely to be effective or
sustainable when personnel turnover rates are significant (for instance, due to high
casualty rates).
In an era of interventions and foreign-imposed regime change, the debate has
enormous policy significance. In the most prominent contemporary example, many
American policy-makers appear to view the problem of standing up a new Iraqi
army as largely logistical. Discussions of building this force seem to hinge on the
presumption that with sufficient equipment, funding, and training, an effective
army will naturally emerge, gradually allowing the United States to devolve security
responsibilities to national forces.9 This view resembles a "retail" model for building
militaries. But Iraq is mired in civil war, ethnic factionalism, and continued doubts
8. The terms "wholesale" and "retail" are suggested by Barry Posen. For use of the former, see
Barry Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security, vol. 18,
no. 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 84.
9. U.S. planning reports emphasize four key goals in rebuilding an Iraqi defense infrastructure, all
of which are based around issues of logistics, administration, or capacity: (1) generating forces;
(2) improving force proficiency; (3) building "logistic, sustainment, and training capacities," and
(4) developing "institutional capacity." See, e.g., U.S. Department of Defense, "Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq," report to Congress (March 2008), available at <http:/
/www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Master%20%20MarO8%20-%20final%20signed.pdf>, pp.
31-36.
about the legitimacy of its nascent process of democratization. Given this
uncertainty, to whom are the newly recruited Iraqi soldiers ultimately loyal?
National civilian leadership? Local or ethnic political leaders and warlords? Their
individual units? The idea of a state itself, through some emerging conception of
patriotism or nationalism? The United States government, which pays its salaries?
This thesis, in a sense, breaks off a piece of the larger puzzle posed by military
reconstruction. Indeed, if legitimacy matters, it begs the question of the extent to
which American policy-makers can affect the resilience of the Iraqi military. In Iraq,
the U.S. and its partners are attempting to do something with little historical
precedent: build a state and a military along separate tracks. By contrast, the
experience of modern Western states is largely one of synergy between the two
institutions: war-making helped form a state, which in turn helped structure and
form a particular type of military.'0 With few historical directly parallel historical
cases to study for relevant lessons, this thesis looks at one underlying component of
the challenge: how the legitimacy of a regime, for instance Iraq's new government,
might impact the resilience, effectiveness, and loyalty of a military. With respect to
Iraq, the issue of loyalty will likely only grow more acute as security stresses on Iraq
increase and the U.S. draws down coalition troop commitments. In short, if soldiers'
propensity to fight under pressure indeed varies with their view of governmental
legitimacy, it is may be a doomed enterprise to center army reform around primarily
logistical and technical concepts. Instead, it may be more important to inculcate a
sense of patriotism, purveying the idea that the army is defending the Iraqi state-
10. I return to these arguments in my theory discussion below; they can be found in Charles Tilly,
"War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), pp. 169-191 and in Samuel E. Finer, "State- and Nation-Building in
Europe: The Role of the Military," in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western
Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 84-163.
regardless of its specific manifestation-against disliked outside enemies that
threaten Iraqi independence.
This thesis proposes two contributions to the larger scholarship on military
effectiveness. First, it attempts to move past the inconsistent way in which the term
effectiveness is often employed in the literature, by focusing instead on a single
factor that impacts effectiveness-military resilience-and operationalizing this term
through easily measurable data points like disintegration and desertion. Second, it
explores two data-rich cases which have largely been ignored by political scientists.
Both cases involve extreme shocks to regime legitimacy, resulting in strong changes
to the "wholesale" factors, with relatively little change to "retail" factors. They thus
offer the possibility of a strong three-cornered fight," since the two theories make
unique and certain predictions of how the legitimacy shock will impact military
:resilience. Specifically, retail theories predict little impact, while wholesale theories
predict a legitimacy vacuum will produce dramatically lowered resilience. The test
cases strongly support the influence of such wholesale factors. While it does not put
a nail in the coffin of retail theories, it provides a critical test to demonstrate that
their explanatory power is not unlimited. As a result, this thesis serves as an exercise
in theory revival, buttressed by a fertile but relatively neglected universe of cases.
LITERATURE FROM THE WHOLESALE AND RETAIL SCHOOLS
Arguments for the impact of wholesale factors on military resilience and
effectiveness have been relatively unpopular in recent political-science literature.
The key work arguing for an impact of macro-level, ideational variables comes from
11. On Imre Lakatos's concept of the three-cornered fight, in which rival theories are pitted against
each other (and the null hypothesis), see Van Evera, Guide to Methods, p. 38.
Barry Posen, who argues that elites purvey nationalism to improve military
capability. Using a Waltzian model, where states in a competitive world emulate the
most effective practices of other states, Posen focuses on the emergence of the mass
army in Revolutionary France.12 He argues that leaders used compulsory education
and propaganda to infuse nationalism in soldiers, resulting in the maintenance of
fighting capability even with rapid replacement of troops. The argument thus
directly connects nationalism and conflict intensity, arguing that nationalism spread
throughout Europe in large part to make mass armies fight harder against other
mass armies. He also cites several works of recent historical scholarship which focus
on the military impact of wholesale factors like ideology, patriotism, and
nationalism.'3 (Indeed, the wholesale school of thought appears to be significantly
more common as an implicit argument in military history rather than as an explicit
argument in political science; additional relevant historical works are discussed in
this thesis's conclusion.) Building on Posen's work, Dan Reiter uses the militarized,
hyper-nationalistic case of Japan in World War II to argue that nationalism
increased Japanese military effectiveness, by making soldiers more willing to risk
their lives for the state, as evidenced in kamikaze attacks.' 4 He notes that
nationalism can also decrease effectiveness by decreasing responsiveness: highly
nationalistic soldiers may not respect the rights of a surrendering enemy, thus
making that enemy more reluctant to surrender.
12. See Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," p. 84. For the neorealist concept
of emulation, see particularly Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston:
McGraw-Hill, 1979).
13. These works are John A. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of
Revolutionary France, 1791-94 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984); Omer Bartov, Hitler's
Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and
John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986).
14. Dan Reiter, "Nationalism and Military Effectiveness: Post-Meiji Japan," in Risa Brooks and
Elizabeth Stanley, eds., Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 27-54.
By contrast, most scholarship on military effectiveness has argued in favor of
retail explanations. Shils and Janowitz's previously-mentioned interviews with
German prisoners suggest that small-unit cohesion was the primary factor in
maintaining Wehrmacht effectiveness in World War II. Their loyalty was to the
"primary group"-the men in the same unit-rather than to "secondary symbols" of
Nazism.'5 Shils and Janowitz's work has rarely been directly challenged; the most
prominent exception is historian Omer Bartov, who argues that primary groups
carry little explanatory power on World War II's eastern front, where high death
and replacement rates would have prevented solidarity from emerging. 16 A large
number of subsequent studies have come to conclusions similar to Shils and
Janowitz, including a prominent study of American soldiers in World War II and a
much-cited volume comparing Wehrmacht and US Army performance by historian
Martin van Creveld.' 7
Many of the cornerstone books on civil-military relations also implicitly fit
into the retail school. Huntington's seminal work deems the emergence of
professionalism as a key explanation for officer loyalty and effectiveness.
Professionalism emerges from careful training, not from shared ideology. It rests
partly on a "military mind" which is generic-common to the profession-and not
"bound to any specific theory of history."'" An isolation of the political and military
15. Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration."
16. Bartov, Hitler's Army. In related challenges to Shils and Janowitz, see Stephen G. Fritz, "'We are
Trying...to Change the Face of the World'-Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the
Eastern Front: The View from Below," Journal of Military History, vol. 60, no. 4 (Oct. 1996), pp.
683-710; W. Victor Madej, "Effectiveness and Cohesion of the German Ground Forces in World
War II," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 6 (Fall 1978), pp. 233-248; and Elliot P.
Chodoff, "Ideology and Primary Groups," Armed Forces and Society, vol. 9, no. 4 (1983), pp.
569-593.
17. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1982); Samuel Stouffer, Edward Suchman, Leland DeVinney, Shirley Star,
and Robin Williams, The American Soldier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949); and
George, "Primary Groups, Organization, and Military Performance."
18. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 64.
spheres is necessary for what Huntington calls objective civilian control. Several
civil-military scholars have also focused on the difficulties in maintaining
multiethnic armies. In the most notable work on the subject, Alon Peled essentially
reverts to a retail-theory explanation for the success of certain multiethnic armies.
In his study, professional officers play the key role in successfully integrating ethnic
groups. Integration occurs more successfully in professional rather than politicized
militaries. When integration succeeds, it usually occurs as the result of
organizational needs rather than ideological factors.' 9
One key roadblock to the adequate testing of retail versus wholesale theories
is the inconsistent definitions used in civil-military relations literature. 20 Literature
on military effectiveness suffers from an inconsistently operationalized dependent
variable, and conflation between correlation and causation. There is no agreed upon
definition of, or metric for, military effectiveness. The central difficulty, of course, is
that military effectiveness does not necessarily translate into military success.
Outcomes also depend on the balance of forces and battlefield circumstances. A
representative definition for effectiveness is Stephen Peter Rosen's: "the amount of
offensive and defensive military power that can be generated by a military
organization from a given level of material resources. " 21 The term, in other words,
generally holds constant raw, quantitative forms of power, and treats as endogenous
military strategy, doctrine, and decision-making. It focuses instead on a military's
ability to translate given strategy and resources into relative levels of battlefield
19. See Alon Peled, A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower in Multiethnic States (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998). See also Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980).
20. Suzanne Nielsen identifies five dependent variables common in civil-military relations work:
coups, military influence, civil-military friction, military compliance with civilian oversight, and
military effectiveness. See Suzanne Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military
Effectiveness," Public Administration and Management, vol. 10, no. 2 (2005), pp. 61-84.
21. Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1996), p. viii.
success.
Despite the flaws inherent in such a method, many scholars have
operationalized military effectiveness with win-loss ratio in battles (offering a larger
range of observation than whole wars)."22 The most formal discussion of
operationalizing effectiveness comes in the introductory essay to a volume edited by
Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley, who break the dependent variable into four
interrelated components: integration (consistent military activity across different
branches), responsiveness (accommodation to both internal and external constraints
and opportunities), skill (that military personnel can perform on the battlefield), and
quality (supply of essential materiel). Independent variables discussed in the
subsequent chapters include culture, social structure, political institutions, civil-
military relations, interstate competition, global norms, and international
organizations. For Brooks and Stanley, military effectiveness combines with military
resources (GNP, technology, industry, human capital) to create military power.23
This patchwork of terms has done little to clarify what is meant by military
effectiveness.
Regardless of how the dependent variable is operationalized, scholars have
pointed to a wide range of independent variables believed to impact military
effectiveness, but rarely have tested these against each other. Several have argued
that regime type matters, and in particular that democracies are more likely to win
wars, though authors differ on the exact mechanism by which this happens.24
22. See Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness," Journal of
Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, no. 3 (June 1998), pp. 259-277. Others have used casualties: see
Stephen Biddle, "Explaining Military Outcomes," in Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley, eds.,
Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press,
2007), pp. 207-227.
23. See Brooks and Stanley, Creating Military Power, pp. 1-26.
24. See, for instance, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, "Democracy and Battlefield Military
Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, no. 3 (June 1998), pp. 259-277; David Lake,
"Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, no. 86 (June
11
Stephen Rosen's discussion of military effectiveness, based mainly on India as a test
case, takes as its explanatory values social structures and the degree to which
military organizations divorce themselves from society.25 Kenneth Pollack examines,
across six states, a number of explanations for Arab military ineffectiveness since
World War II: poor unit cohesion, disappointing generals, flawed tactical leadership
at the junior-officer level, bad information management, technical skills that
hamper weapons handling, problematic logistical and maintenance operations, low
morale, inadequate training, and cowardice. He dismisses three factors in the Arab
case (cowardice, cohesion, and logistics), finds mixed presence of three (morale,
generalship, and training), and notes widespread issues with tactical leadership,
information management, weapons handling, and maintenance. Pollack's work, it
should be noted, has little explanatory power because it does not purport to provide
or test any theory of causation, but instead catalogs, out of a large set of possible
causal factors, attributes that were and were not present in the Arab cases.26
LEGITIMACY AND RESILIENCE
This thesis argues that regime legitimacy increases military resilience. In
testing this, it attempts to address several of the aforementioned gaps in civil-
military scholarship, including the failure to explore wholesale explanations
alongside retail ones. The thesis examines two test cases where the wholesale
independent variable sharply and quickly varies, while retail independent variables
1992), pp. 24-37; and, with more attention to serious correlation-causation issues in such
studies, Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper
Look," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 48, no. 4 (Aug. 2004), pp. 525-546.
25. Rosen, Societies and Military Power.
26. Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2002).
are held steady. These cases allow us to pit the small-unit cohesion explanations of
Shils and Janowitz against theories like Posen's hypotheses on nationalism and the
mass army or the Nazi-ideology-focused historical scholarship of Bartov. In taking
resilience as its dependent variable, this thesis also focuses on a more specific, and
readily operationalized, aspect of military effectiveness than is typical in the
literature.
I define legitimacy as the internal belief, shared among a population, that the
government has a right to exercise political authority within its territory.2 7 It is a
shared sense of purpose that binds those who hold it. Legitimacy may be indirectly
produced or manipulated by elites through a variety of forces. Patriotism,
:nationalism, religion, ideology, and good governance can all increase legitimacy by
developing shared values and a sense of loyalty. Nationalism and patriotism-unlike
good governance-are ways of instilling a sense of legitimacy on the cheap and on
the fly, but they are not the only sources of legitimacy. Legitimacy exists on a
continuous spectrum, and does not require that a citizen agree with every decision
of his government: while the two may covary at times, regime legitimacy should
remain relatively more stable than would mere approval of leaders or their
decisions. Legitimacy does not require a particular system of government,
distinguishing this argument from those of scholars who have argued that
democracies fight wars more effectively. Legitimacy and authoritarianism are not
mutually exclusive; a population can accept the right of an oppressive regime to
rule. Still, democratic regimes are often seen as highly legitimate, while
27. See Seymor Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & Co., 1960), p. 77. I draw also on the restatement of Lipset in Joseph Rothschild,
"Obsevations on Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe," Political Science Quarterly, vol.
92, no. 3 (Fall 1997), p. 488.
authoritarian regimes may have to work to build the sense of legitimacy. 28
Because scholars have reached no clear consensus either regarding the
sources or definition of legitimacy, the term has inherent limitations. However, its
use in the literature consistently suggests that legitimacy pertains to how a
government transforms raw power into authority.2 9 Similarly, this thesis explores
how a military can obtain loyalty and resilience from its soldiers without simply
resorting to the coercive methods of court-martials. As such, the term is used
throughout this thesis to reflect a variety of sources of loyalty-most notably forms
of shared group identity, including cultural, national, and ideological solidarity.
I define military resilience as the willingness of individual troops to remain
committed on the battlefield, particularly in difficult situations. Such commitment
has both passive and active components. In a passive sense, commitment involves
the decision not to "disintegrate," to use the Shils and Janowitz term, which
includes, from highest commitment failure to lowest: individual and collective
desertion, active surrender, passive surrender, routine resistance, and last-ditch
resistance.3" In an active sense, commitment involves a soldier's decision to
participate above and beyond the minimal acceptable level demanded by their
commanding officers. Resilient behavior thus ranges from sacrifice and loyalty at
one end, to compliance somewhere in the middle, to resistance and outright
rebellion or disintegration at the worst end. Military resilience is one part of military
effectiveness. I choose this narrower dependent variable because legitimacy seems
unlikely to affect many components of effectiveness-for instance, the four
28. Lipset, Political Man, p. 78.
29. See Mattei Dogan, "Conceptions of Legitimacy," in M.E. Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan,
eds., Encyclopedia of Government and Politics (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 116-126.
30. Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration," p. 282.
disaggregated aspects specified by Brooks and Stanley.3" A highly resilient army can
still lose because of battlefield conditions, unfavorable balance of forces, poor
leadership or logistics, or simply bad luck. Additional problems make it difficult to
directly observe resilience: soldiers may lose resilience as the result of likely defeat,
creating an endogeneity problem, and less resilient units may be less likely to be
employed in difficult battles, creating a selection bias.
As a result, military resilience is not easy to measure. Observing it with
accuracy requires holding all other factors that affect battlefield behavior equal. Still,
it is easier to measure than military effectiveness, simply because it disaggregates an
otherwise unwieldy concept. Since in practice we will rarely obtain a perfect test
comparison, we look for evidence of poor or exceptional performance where factors
other than intensity of soldiers' commitment can not adequately explain the gap
between expected and observed performance. We can use objective data that
directly demonstrates disintegration, which includes desertion rates or evidence
from military court-martials of cowardice or defection. Additionally, we can
supplement this with more subjective data in the form of military histories,
including estimations of how a unit held up relative to what might be expected of a
similarly trained and supplied unit in a similar situation. If military historians argue
that a unit held together under unusually difficult circumstances, it suggests a high
degree of resilience, even if the unit was ultimately unsuccessful. If troops fled,
deserted, or surrendered-and particularly in a situation where the balance of forces
did not overwhelmingly suggest their failure-such disintegration suggests a low
degree of resilience.
31. Resilience would fit most closely into their "skill" category, as one component of how soldiers
comport themselves on the battlefield.
How Legitimacy Generates Resilience
Military resilience is affected by legitimacy because of an antecedent
condition: the difficulty of getting troops to perform under conditions of dispersion
created by modern warfare. The 18th century saw the development of several
characteristics of modern wars, including the mass army and growth in the use of
skirmishers. Skirmishers fought outside the close-knit battle lines, which had
emphasized quantity of firepower over quality of fighting; skirmishers
independently chose and attacked targets in small units or individually.32 This
dispersion helped set off the modern army from previous incarnations: the new
military required increased skill and effort by the individual soldier, who were no
longer simply cannon fodder. Technological developments in the 20th century have
furthered this. Modern-system defense and modern-system offense-Biddle's terms
to describe the cooperative and complex tactics that emerged in World War I-
require high levels of skill, coordination, and in-the-moment ingenuity.
Increasingly, the 20th century came to focus on small units, maneuvering and
performing with increased independence, creating stressors on both morale and
technique."
These technological and tactical developments of modern warfare brought
with them a change in military recruitment. Starting in the 19th century, modern
armies came to rely on citizens and national troops, rather than the custom of
multinational forces recruited from foreign volunteers. 34 The increased need for skill
and effort no doubt made military planers more attuned to issues of loyalty. As
32. See Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," pp. 91-92.
33. Biddle, Military Power, pp. 30-35 and pp. 38-39.
'34. Finer, "State- and Nation-Building in Europe," pp. 101-102.
Alexander George puts it: "Modern weapons have only exacerbated a long-standing
problem of warfare: the task of getting everyone to engage effectively in combat and
the related task of maintaining the cohesion and performance of the combat unit
under the shock, danger, and cumulative stress of battle."35 A turn to recruiting
national armies, in parallel with the development of a common national identity,
was a logical way to answer this challenge. In his discussion of the move from
limited war to the possibility of total war, Von Clausewitz concurs that the face of
war was changed as the forces of nationalism moved war beyond the strict purview
of governments and into the realm of the people. Discussing the French revolution,
he writes:
"People at first expected to have to deal only with a seriously weakened
French army; but in 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination.
Suddenly war again became the business of the people-a people of thirty
millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens... This juggernaut
of war, based on the strength of the entire people, began its pulverizing
course through Europe... There seemed no end to the resources mobilized; all
limits disappeared in the vigor and enthusiasm shown by governments and
their subjects. Various factors powerfully increased that vigor: the vastness of
available resources, the ample field of opportunity, and the depth of feeling
generally aroused... War, untrammeled by any conventional restraints, had
broken lose in all its elemental fury."36
The crux of the mass army is its ability to cheaply and quickly motivate a
large number of people to high degrees of battlefield resilience. The modern
professional army seeks to do the same with a much smaller group of soldiers and
officers. This incurs higher costs and requires more training. The problem of
instilling motivation in soldiers resembles the difficulties faced by any large
organization. Organizational theorist James Q. Wilson stresses a bottom-up rather
than top-down understanding of large bureaucracies: understanding a bureaucracy's
35. George, "Primary Groups, Organization, and Military Performance," p. 294.
36. Von Clausewitz, On War, pp. 591-3.
effectiveness requires understanding its members personal beliefs, interests, and
conception of the organization's culture. Obtaining compliance within these
organizations-' la resilience in a military-requires providing incentives for those
members, whether through "a sense of duty and purpose, the status that derives
from individual recognition and personal power, and the associational benefits that
come from being part of an organization."37 That third source, also called solidarity,
resembles the explanation given for military resilience by small-unit effectiveness
theorists. The first obviously resembles the wholesale theory. An economy of
incentives determines the degree of compliance. Ideology, Wilson argues, will
particularly matter in jobs where job tasks are most weakly defined and
enforcement is most diffuse.38 This, of course, resembles the environment created by
the dispersion and tactics of modern war-where solidarity may be insufficient
without a higher sense of purpose.
Regime legitimacy can impact the resilience of soldiers in a modern army in
two ways, which speak to the passive and active components of resilience,
respectively. First, a legitimate government will have less difficulty obtaining
compliance with its requests. The creation and maintenance of a military requires
extracting from a society both costs and manpower. Governments can use either
coercion or persuasion to obtain these sacrifices-with persuasion made possible
through the manipulation of beliefs, whether religious, nationalistic, or otherwise.3 9
A government that lacks legitimacy will find resilience inhibited by citizens' views
that the government is not appropriate and therefore not worthy of voluntary
sacrifice. This should extend to all aspects of raising a military: taxes, recruitment
37. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (Basic Books,
1989), p. 157.
38. Wilson, Bureaucracy, p. 54.
39. Finer, "State- and Nation-Building in Europe," p. 96.
through draft or volunteer forces, and maintaining troop compliance on the
battlefield. Soldiers in an illegitimate regime will be less likely to volunteer for
military service, more likely to resist drafts, and more likely to engage in some form
of disintegration.
Second, legitimacy affects resilience in a more active, positive sense. Soldiers
who view their regime as legitimate are likely to go above and beyond the minimal
expectation. This is an advantage of wholesale rather than retail motivation.
Particularly in defensive engagements, where the shared belief that created the
legitimacy is perceived as being at risk, soldiers who share a sense of legitimacy
should be highly resilient. This may help explain why states sometimes attempt to
couch all actions-including offensive ones-in defensive terms. In the second case
in this thesis, concerning foreign units in World War II, Baltic conscripts fought most
effectively when they felt they were defending their homeland from Russian
invaders, not when they were on the offensive on behalf of the Germans. This may
be attributable simply to the fact that the defense is easier than the offense, a
cornerstone principle for Clausewitz and other military theorists.40 The research
design of this thesis cannot adequately test the wholesale theory against this
alternative explanation. Still, while the relative ease of the defense may explain
some variation, states can make efforts to spin combat as defensive or offensive to
serve broader purposes. The fluidity of the eastern front in World War II makes it
nearly impossible to distinguish between offensive and defensive operations on a
purely tactical level; indeed, military leaders play a significant role in shaping soldier
and officer attitudes regarding the purpose of their military activity.
To at least some extent, perceptions of legitimacy can be affected by deliberate
40. Von Clausewitz, On War, p. 328
state behavior. Even the most authoritarian regimes have often sought to legitimate
their behavior. The manipulation of shared ideologies is possible, at least according
to scholars who view nationalism as generated by elites. The creation of legitimacy is
commonly part of the process of nation-building, as distinguished from state-
building. A modern nation has a sense of community and identity or shared
consciousness, which are not necessarily attributes of a state.4 1 It may be easier to
purvey forces that increase legitimacy to certain populations. For instance, in the
World War II case study, Nazi leaders were very effective at infusing German SS
units with a racist ideology, but less effective-even with similar training-at
infusing that ideology in non-German SS units. Since leaders can manipulate both
conceptions and definitions of nationality-as well as the degree to which a
population identifies itself with a given nationality-the wholesale theories carry
prescriptive utility.
TESTING THE THEORY
Hypotheses and Predictions
The wholesale and retail theories of military resilience generate two divergent
hypotheses about how resilient armies should be built:
Hwl. Legitimacy-whether generated through nationalism, patriotism,
ideology, or otherwise- increases the resilience of military units. As units
view their regime as increasingly illegitimate, they become more likely to
disintegrate, decreasing resilience.
HR,, Small-unit cohesion, well-supplied units, extensive training, and
professionalism increase the resilience of military units.
Both hypotheses may well hold simultaneously; however, each theory makes
41. See Finer, "State- and Nation-Building in Europe," pp. 86, 88-89.
an argument about the relative resilience of armies motivated through the two
methods. The wholesale view holds that in the toughest battle situations, shared
purpose will generate the most tooth-and-nail fighting, evidencing active rather
than passive commitment; the retail school does not see legitimacy as relevant to
resilience:
Hw2. Armies whose resilience is built on legitimacy rather than on retail
factors are more likely to exhibit active commitment.
HR2. Armies built using retail factors do not need legitimacy or ideology to
keep troops actively committed in battle, and their military resilience will not
be significantly affected by changes to legitimacy or ideology.
Fully testing the wholesale theory would also require further examination of
two other constituent hypotheses, concerning the causes of legitimacy and the
relevance of military effectiveness. Neither hypothesis is unique to the wholesale
school, though testing them is not necessary for the retail theory:
Hw3. When elites purvey forces like patriotism, ideology, and nationalism,
they manipulate and increase legitimacy.
Hw4.All other factors held equal, increased military resilience will increase
military effectiveness.
There is also a cost-benefit argument implicit in the wholesale theory, which
is not tested in this thesis:
Hw5. Generating legitimacy creates an economy of scale for building a military.
It is cheaper and quicker to purvey ideology or patriotism to a mass army
than it is to train an equivalently powerful professional army.
We can make a number of empirical predictions about what we should
observe in our test cases if the wholesale theory is accurate. Several predictions
concern the behavior of military forces and are expected to be seen in the case data
if Hwl is true:
Units composed of men who do not view a regime as legitimate will be
more likely to disintegrate, through desertion, surrender, or disorganized battlefield
behavior. They are most likely to do so at points when an army is stressed to the
breaking point-e.g., battles towards the end of a war when defeat is increasingly
likely, or any battle where loss is likely-for two reasons. First of all, at that point,
the personal costs of compliance (danger of dying) are at their highest. Secondly,
methods of coercion are most difficult to apply in the heat of battle. Resilience is a
factor that normally compels soldiers to fight even when loss is a likely outcome.
* When competing loyalties are pitted against each other in a particular
combat situation, soldiers should resort to fighting for the regime-or at least
defecting so they are not opposing the regime-that holds the most legitimacy to
them.
* A shock to legitimacy should inspire a marked change in battlefield
resilience. A legitimation crisis may come during a sudden regime change, including
the takeover of a country by an invader.
* In terms of the observable secondary effects of this theory, we should
expect to find statements-diaries, interviews, correspondence-of soldiers in
regimes with low legitimacy that reveal questions of their ability to faithfully
execute the commands of higher officers. Reluctance to fight because of illegitimacy
is likely to be a self-conscious decision.
A range of other predictions applies to elites of states who may seek to alter
their behavior based on the influence of legitimacy. These suggest that elites are
operating on the belief that HW2 is true. To make these strong predictions for the
theory, we should not only see elites follow these patterns of behavior-which could
simply mean they are operating on a misguided basis-but also evidence that the
behavior is successful.
* States should use methods to instill a sense of legitimacy when engaged in
defensive combat and a sense of ideological fervor when on the offense. This may be
done through several of the methods that increase legitimacy discussed above; it
may also take the form of propaganda, the mixing of ethnic forces to dilute and
diffuse those with questionable loyalty, or the use of volunteer rather than conscript
forces (who are more likely to join for ideological reasons).
* States may try to make their engagements appear defensive rather than
offensive, to suggest to soldiers that the shared source of legitimacy is at stake.
* If legitimacy is low, states should employ more coercive means (military
police, court-martials, etc.) to ensure compliance and increase resilience.
* If leaders are aware that certain units have little respect for the regime's
legitimacy, they should be less likely to deploy those units in the most difficult
battles, introducing a potential selection effect.
Research Design
The case-study method is appropriate for a preliminary test of this theory. We
are attempting to assess one necessary criterion, not all sufficient criteria, for
military resilience. Case studies are ideal at the task of identifying scope conditions
(less so at identifying relative causal weights).42 Both cases utilize the method of
difference, though with slightly different research designs. The first case compares
SS units with similar values for many factors that might affect resilience-training,
42. See Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 25-26.
battle conditions-but sharply different values on the study variable, legitimacy:
some of the units are German while others are foreign and largely unsympathetic to
Nazi causes. In the second case, the comparison is longitudinal rather than across
different units; it examines the resilience of a single army over a period of time in
which the study variable experiences a sharp change, the result of the fragmentation
of the Yugoslav state and reconstitution of its army.43 The two different research
designs compensate for two distinct challenges in doing controlled comparisons to
test wholesale theories of military resilience. The first case compensates for the
difficulty in holding both raw military power and battlefield conditions constant
over time, by using pairings of forces fighting under similar conditions. The second,
longitudinal design compensates for the fact that variation in legitimacy is hard to
operationalize and thus difficult to compare across multiple regimes. It instead relies
on the sudden variation of legitimacy for a single actor within a single regime.
Selecting cases for extreme values on the independent variable-i.e., looking
at states where legitimacy is highly in question-is appropriate here because it
allows for testing unique and certain predictions." Changes to the study variable
may be found by looking for shocks to legitimacy. These are easily seen in a strand
of cases consisting of artificial or proxy militaries, where a military is fighting on
behalf of a third-party regime and questions of legitimacy and loyalty are apparent.
This yields a rich set of potential cases from conquest and colonialism, including the
quisling militaries that fought for Nazi Germany or Cold War-era armies involved in
43. This longitudinal controlled comparison resembles what Van Evera calls a type-two congruence
procedure, which uses multiple data points across a single case. In this method, the researcher
determines whether the paired observations covary as the theory expects. See Van Evera, Guide
to Methods, p. 61. However, congruence method generally refers to what Van Evera calls a type-
one congruence procedure: the comparison of the theoretically expected relationship between
IV and DV with the observed relationship in a single case. See George and Bennett, Case Studies
and Theory Development, p. 181-183.
44. For more on this strategy, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 79-81.
proxy wars during periods of weak or puppet regimes (e.g., the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam and the U.S., or the Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet
Union).45 Since they do not involve an army being rebuilt from scratch, they also
provide the necessary continuity for within-case process-tracing: a European unit
forced to fight for the Nazi cause will have relatively constant levels of objective
military capability, but soldiers' perceptions of regime legitimacy may change
dramatically.
Cases
The two cases share a shock to legitimacy, though the sources of this shock
are opposite: integration through conquest in one case and fragmentation through
nationalism in the second. In both cases, elite behavior, at least initially, did not
successfully compensate for thesudden decrease to legitimacy created by the shock.
In World War II, the German military, increasingly desperate for manpower on the
Eastern front, built up foreign legions comprised of soldiers from occupied countries.
In the elite Waffen SS, half a million foreigners served by choice or by draft; every
one of that force's divisions had some non-German representation. A theory based
on regime legitimacy helps explain the varying levels of military effectiveness
between the foreign legions observed by World War II historians: by and large, the
foreign legions underperformed relative to their Germanic counterparts-even when
accounting for differences in training and combat conditions. Moreover, they
performed at their best when there was a sense of national purpose-a key
45. On the issue of establishing Soviet loyalty in Warsaw Pact militaries, see Dale Herspring and
Ivan Volgyes (eds.,), Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder: Westview Press,
1978). They argue that only the East German forces would have been effective had the Soviets
engaged in offensive military action against NATO. For an opposing view, see Douglas
MacGregor, "Uncertain Allies? East European Forces in the Warsaw Pact," Soviet Studies, vol. 38,
no. 2 (April 1986), pp. 227-247.
generator of legitimacy-to their actions: the Baltic states defending against further
Soviet occupation, for instance. Since German military performance is also the case
from which most small-unit effectiveness theories were inductively generated, the
failure of this theory to explain relative military performance on the eastern front
provides a strong and infirming test.
The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s
provides a second test case, though in this case nationalism was not pitted against an
occupying force, but instead provided the impetus for states to break away from a
loose federation. During the first secessions-of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia in the
early 1990s-the longstanding Yugoslav People's Army, widely regarded as a
powerful and well-trained military, vastly underperformed, while the relatively rag-
tag armies of the seceding states generated significant success with limited
equipment and manpower. The Yugoslav People's Army remained committed to an
idea of pan-Yugoslav communism rendered defunct by the secessions, which caused
it to operate essentially on behalf of Serbian nationalists. This in turn alienated non-
Serbian members of the army, who defected or deserted, heavily decreasing the
military's combat performance. Significantly, when the army was reconstituted as a
largely Serbian army under the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it regained
much of its prior combat effectiveness. In the late 1990s, it performed well even
when vastly outmatched by NATO firepower and finances.
These cases have some limitations. First of all, as mentioned previously, it is
difficult to distinguish between an explanation for resilience based on shared
ethnicity and an explanation based on (more manipulable sense of) shared
legitimacy. Because the legitimacy divisions in these cases occur along ethnic lines-
German versus non-Germanic soldiers, Serbian versus non-Serbian soldiers-they
may not provide enough data points to fully distinguish between, for instance,
patriotism and ethnicity as explanations for resilience. Moreover, since defensive
engagements tend to be associated with higher legitimacy, some of the variation
might be explained by Clausewitz's idea of the relative ease of the defense. A second
limitation is the data available about the Yugoslav case. Without primary-source
materials, the case does not offer much evidence for testing the retail theory.
However, in both cases, the emphasis is on testing the wholesale theory against a
null hypothesis. This is because our hypotheses state that if the retail theory fully
explains military resilience, a shock to legitimacy-if accompanied by no other
changes-will not affect resilience. Thus, a demonstration by these two cases that
legitimacy affects resilience contradicts retail theory. Thirdly, a lack of detailed on-
the-ground evidence makes it difficult to distinguish between a wholesale theory as
the original or proximate cause of military resilience. For instance, shared ethnicity
may lead to resilience for the simple reason that everyone wants to make it home
safely, an idea that shares much in common with small-unit cohesion and retail
theory-with the notable difference that the cohesion is not created through
training and professionalism but through wholesale factors. Finally, the evidence
used does not speak to all of the generated hypotheses: while Hwl, HW2, and HR2
receive relatively strong tests, HR1,Hw3, Hw4, and Hw5 would all require additional
case material. However, despite these limitations, the case work serves as a strong
plausibility probe for the revival of wholesale arguments and also suggests that the
retail school's theories are insufficient to explain at least these two cases.
2. Foreign Soldiers in the Waffen-SS, 1940-1945
The all-out fighting on the eastern front made it easily the bloodiest, most vicious
theater in World War II. There, total war was fueled by a combination of manpower
and belief-fierce racism and irreconcilable ideological collision between the Nazis
and Soviets. The front opened with a massive, and remarkably successful, surprise
attack on June 22, 1941, involving three million German soldiers, half a million
allied soldiers, 600,000 horses, and 2700 war planes. 46 But the Soviet's remarkable
ability to continually replenish their troop strength ensured that a ruthless war
raged until May 1945. It was, of course, the decisive front in the European theater.
For a war so defined by racial hatred, it is perhaps surprising that a great deal of
Hitler's military might derived from non-German soldiers, the foreign soldiers who
volunteered or were conscripted into Wehrmacht and particularly elite Waffen-SS
units. Particularly among the draftees, many of these soldiers did not share in Nazi
ideals. This enables a strong method-of-difference test for explaining the varying
resilience of units: the case provides roughly constant battle conditions and training
methods across units, which differ mainly in their vastly different views of Nazi
legitimacy.
A legitimacy-based explanation provides the best tool for understanding the
relative military resilience of divisions fighting for Nazi Germany. Amidst an army
noted for its cohesion and resilience even at the war's twilight, in the face of near-
inevitable defeat and in the harsh conditions of the eastern front, the foreign
legions-those with the lowest perceptions of legitimacy of the German regime-
underperformed relative to German divisions. This is true even when battle
46. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), p. 264.
conditions, skill, and training are taken into account. In those cases where the
foreign legions were resilient, a sense of national legitimacy was maintained: for
instance, Latvian legions fought in separate national divisions, motivated in large
part by a desire to prevent the return of Soviet occupiers. Even though
fighting under German command, the foreign legions remained in many ways
essentially nationalist divisions. Moreover, Western units comprised of volunteers
performed better than Eastern units comprised of conscripts, a discrepancy that
cannot be accounted for by retail explanations alone.
This chapter begins with a historical overview of the Waffen-SS, Hitler's elite
military branch; more than the rest of the German military, SS units were
indoctrinated and infused with Nazi ideology. It then provides a chronology of the
decision by Nazi officials to bring in half a million foreign troops over the course of
the war, initially in multiethnic divisions and later in primarily national divisions.
Next, the core of the chapter examines military histories for evidence of the relative
resilience of foreign and German units. Because the secondary literature on these
units is relatively spotty, the chapter does not perform the ideal controlled
comparison, two units paired with largely identical training, leadership, equipment,
experience, and battle conditions. Instead, it makes use of the available sources to
amass evidence of the relative resilience of broad types of units-German,
multiethnic, Western volunteer, and Eastern conscript-holding other factors
constant wherever possible. The case of the Latvian legion, which is useful in ruling
out alternative explanations, is explored in relatively greater depth; however,
limited military history hinders an alternative research design, which would consist
of a full longitudinal study of this unit alone. The chapter concludes by arguing that
this evidence supports the wholesale hypotheses for the difference in resilience
across types of units, and that other explanations fail to fully explain these
anomalies.
THE WAFFEN-SS
The majority of the German Wehrmacht's might was concentrated in the Heer,
or regular Army. Smaller, more obscured by history, but in many ways more elite
and effective, were the troops provided by the Nazi party's Schutzstaffel, run by
Henrich Himmler. The SS today is most remembered for its infamous role in
perpetrating war crimes, creating a brutal police state, and running concentration
camps, a mission undertaken by the SS Totenkopfverbiinde. But it also played a major
military role in the war, through its Waffen-SS (armed SS), under the operational
command of the Wehrmacht but separated both in training and in its members'
heightened commitment to Nazi ideology. The Waffen-SS was marked by a kind of
"mental totalitarianism...an ideology based entirely on obedience to orders," 47 and
was particularly effective and ruthless in offensive actions throughout the European
theater.
The SS originated in the 1920s as a protection service for Hitler, but its
unique character began to develop after Himmler took charge in 1929. First
employed in combat during the annexation of Czechoslovakia, three full and one
half Waffen-SS division were used in the invasion of France, where they showed a
"toughness and determination that bordered on the reckless." 48 That determination
47. Bernd Wegner, trans. Ronald Webster, The Waffen-SS: Organization, Ideology, and Function
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 18.
48. George H. Stein, The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1966), p. xxvi, 24, 89. Despite its age, Stein's book remains the key study of the Waffen-SS,
rivaled only by Wegner's account, which focuses less on military and historical performance
and more on the Waffen-SS's ideological development and organizational structure. For a
general-audience account, see John Keegan, Waffen SS: The Asphalt Soldiers (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1970).
became even more visible on the eastern front, where the ideological and racial
nature of the war were a perfect mesh for the attitudes inculcated by SS leadership.
Its effectiveness was increased by the high physical barriers for volunteer selection,
combined with extensive training, elite leadership, and attention from Hitler that
brought funding for state-of-the-art equipment. This battle success in turn improved
frosty SS relations with the Wehrmacht, which felt acute competition for both
manpower and equipment. "The more savage the war became, the more the
fighting qualities of the SS stood out," writes George Stein. 49
Unlike the Heer, whose training relied more on inculcating unit cohesion, the
SS was a force built heavily around ideology. Recruiting criteria centered on race,
physique, and character, not intellectual or social characteristics. Though initially
conscription was limited only to the SS's non-military units, by the end of the war,
the need for more and more soldiers on the eastern front turned the Waffen-SS into a
force increasingly resembling a mass army. More than half of its soldiers were
drafted." Ideologically, Himmler saw the SS as having broader ends than purely
military: Nazi notions of racial superiority, Lebensraum, and religiousness were
inculcated in its members through speeches, training, propaganda, newsletters, and
recreational activities.51 Subsequent interviews with SS members-who have
mounted a fairly active propaganda campaign designed to absolve themselves of
responsibility for the most heinous of Nazi Germany's war crimes-have tended to
downplay the role of ideology, arguing that the Waffen-SS was as non-political as
most conventional armed forces. However, most historians look on such accounts
skeptically. First of all, before the introduction of conscription, those joining the SS
49. Stein, The Waffen SS, pp. 130, 134.
50. Wegner, The Waffen-SS, pp. 134, 308.
51. Wegner, The Waffen-SS, p. 20.
would have been well aware of its ideological separation from the rest of the
Wehrmacht. Moreover, the extensive program of indoctrination and propaganda
would have made it hard for any soldier to remain fully non-political or non-
ideological.52
The Evolution of Foreign Legions
Many historians have noted that the Waffen-SS might be history's best
example of a multiethnic mass army." By the conclusion of the war, half a million
foreigners-volunteers and conscripts-comprised more than half the Waffen-SS's
manpower. Half of its 38 divisions were primarily foreign legions, and no divisions
remained comprised in their entirety of native Germans. The bulk of the foreigners
were from eastern Europe, along with 125,000 western Europeans, the latter mostly
volunteers.5 4 The decision to recruit foreigners was driven in part by competition for
manpower with the Wehrmacht, which had more power in conscripting German
troops.5 5 Broader political objectives may also have underlaid Himmler's request for
and Hitler's authorization of foreign recruits: the notion that once the war was won,
the Waffen-SS would serve as the basis of a multinational army for a German empire.
This helps explain why recruitment was focused on those of racial and ethnic
descent compatible with Nazi ideology. 56 Despite the ever-increasing need for troops
due to the constant slaughter on the eastern front, the Waffen-SS continued to
welcome only those of Germanic descent; French, Croatian, and Spanish soldiers
52. Wegner, The Waffen-SS, p. 124-5.
53. Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 287.
54. Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 137-138.
55. Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 99.
56. For the most complete fleshing out of this argument, see Mark P. Gingerich, "Waffen SS
Recruitment in the 'Germanic Lands,' 1940-1941," Historian, vol. 59, no. 4 (Summer 1997), pp.
815-831. See also Wegner, The Waffen-SS, p. 351.
were, at least initially, only allowed in non-SS components of the Wehrmacht.57
Who were these non-German Europeans, and what motivated those who
volunteered? The initial recruits came primarily through local collaborationist
groups with Nazi sympathies, like the national socialist parties in Denmark, Norway,
the Netherlands, and Belgium. The SS Nordland and SS Westland comprised the first
Germanic but non-German regiments.5 8 The Western European volunteers were
largely "ideologically motivated by Germanic concepts of the New Order, pan-
Germanism, and anti-Bolshevism, as well as the apparent desire to escape the
declining circumstances of their native homelands," argues Kenneth Estes, based on
memoirs and interviews with soldiers and officers. In a 1948 survey of over 400
non-Germans who fought for the Nazi military, the majority-176 out of the 282
who were members of a national socialist party-attributed their decision either to
duty to the national socialist party or to idealism; of the 150 who were not members
of a national socialist party, most cited domestic concerns (food shortages for 71,
poor situation at home for 19). German leadership, particularly training mastermind
Obergruppenfiihrer Felix Steiner, emphasized the pan-Europeanism of the Waffen-SS
to build loyalty among these new recruits. 59
The SS Wiking was formed as the first major multiethnic division, and it
played a major role in the 1941 invasion of Ukraine and 1942 combat into the
Caucasus. However, replacement troops-increasingly assigned without regard to
nationality, subject to less training, and having had less time to develop unit
57. Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 153.
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1940-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), available at: <http://www.gutenberg-
e.org/esk01l/>, ch. 2, para. 4. Estes's work, digitally published by Columbia University Press, is
the only book-length work in English specifically on foreign troops in the German World War II
military, but it focuses on the Western European volunteers rather than the Eastern European
conscripts.
cohesion-proved less effective; German officers complained that they would "cry
like babies." As a result, Himmler increasingly emphasized separate national legions
over multinational divisions.60 With the Waffen-SS having suffered 43,000 casualties
by 1942, it began heavy recruitment in the east, forming divisions for Romanians,
Yugoslavians, Latvians, Estonians, and others. Insufficient numbers volunteered,
leading to the use of coercive propaganda and finally to outright conscription in the
east, starting in 1943. These foreign legions, though considered full Waffen-SS
divisions, generally did not wear the signature SS runes, using national emblems
instead. Some of the divisions were used primarily for local counterinsurgency
operations, as with the SS Prinz Eugen (ethnic Germans-Volksdeutsche-from
Yugoslavia), while others existed primarily for propaganda value and never saw
combat-the Indian Legion and British Free Corps being notable examples.61
RESILIENCE OF THE WAFFEN-SS's FOREIGN LEGIONS
Two generalizations may be made regarding the combat performance of the
Waffen-SS's foreign soldiers. The first is that their resilience, never particularly high,
only declined over the course of the war. Uncommitted fighting, disintegration,
surrender, and mutiny were common, particularly as German chances at victory
decreased. This is consistent with the first hypothesis (Hw,), and first empirical
prediction, of the wholesale theory. The second generalization is that the Western
European volunteer troops tended to be much more effective than the Eastern
European conscripts. This gradient in resilience parallels the degree to which these
troops felt they were fighting for a shared, legitimate cause, again supporting the
60. Estes, European Anabasis, ch. 2, para. 22.
61. Stein, The Waffen SS, pp. 168-179, 189.
wholesale theory, both Hw and Hw2. SS soldiers were trained to lead and operate in
small, high-powered units that could deploy quickly, independently, and inflict
heavy casualties. 62 The foreign troops initially were able to perform on par with
German SS members, particularly in settings where German and non-German (but
of Germanic descent) troops were mixed, like the SS Wiking. They could also be as
ruthless as the purely German divisions. The SS Prinz Eugen, a Yugoslav Volksdeutsche
division formed in 1941, was put in charge of counterinsurgency operations in the
Balkans against communist partisans. One partisan who remembered fighting
against the Prinz Eugen said later that "the German SS men were better fighters, but
the traitors in the SS were ruthless, killing prisoners always. "63
However, despite such scattered military successes, the foreign legions
produced more than their share of headaches, from resignations to outright
mutiny-key evidence of low resilience. Ineffective fighting is not necessarily
evidence of low resilience, but in most of these cases, historians have argued that
the foreign legion's unusual ineffectiveness stemmed from disintegration rather than
from, say, inadequate skill or poor leadership. Many of the concerns centered
around morale issues, as when SS leaders would attempt to extend service lengths
of those who expected to be returned home. Language barriers also caused
numerous problems. Defection was not uncommon, in keeping with both the first
and second empirical predictions from the introduction. A Norwegian and a Dane
deserted the SS Nordland in 1942.64 In 1943, 206 Croat members mutinied from the
same Prinz Eugen division that had been so ruthless in fighting partisans.65 December
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1944 saw a series of mutinies in the 19th Waffen Grenadier SS (2nd Latvian).66 Even
larger numbers simply resigned: of the initial 166 Norwegians who volunteered for
the SS Wiking, 72 requested their release within a few months; a quarter of the 9,000
Dutch volunteers were dismissed that fall; and in 1943, nearly all the Finnish
volunteers attempted to leave the SS Wiking. Nearly 6,000 Germanic volunteers had
resigned from the Waffen-SS by summer 1943, representing more than a fifth of all
the volunteers thus far recruited.67
The wholesale theory also finds support from data consistent with the
prediction that defensively-framed operations may generate a higher sense of
legitimacy. Aside from regional counterinsurgency operations like those performed
by the Prinz Eugen, military historians have noted that the Germans tended to find
foreign troops most useful in defensive operations. To be sure, this could also be
because defensive operations are tactically simpler than offensive, and less resilient
troops would logically be deployed in such situations; the research design of this
thesis does not attempt to test a Clausewitzian competing explanation. In the
Wehrmacht, the Spanish division was useful as a second-tier infantry force in "limited
offensive and static defensive missions," since its large size gave it the ability to
quickly replace troops in difficult fighting. When reconstituted as a smaller legion in
1943 as part of the Waffen SS, it quickly crumbled and retreated in 1944 in the face
of very light opposition from a Soviet offensive on the Volkhov front. Even while
very hard-pressed for troops, the German command forbade it from fighting and
returned it to Spain by April 1944. Also in the Wehrmacht, the Walloons-French-
speaking Belgians-were useful in the defensive, while they had only one major
66. Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 194.
67. Wegner, The Waffen-SS, p. 329
offensive success. A strong indicator that this relates to legitimacy is their outsized
reputation for nationalistic and ideological cohesion under the leadership of Leon
Degrelle, who convinced them that fighting for the Nazi cause was the best way to
ensure the Belgians a leadership role in a newly unified Europe.6 8 The French legion
was small and lacked resilience even in the defensive.69
Consistent with the elite-centered predictions of wholesale theories of
resilience, German leaders showed sensitivity to manipulating the sense of
legitimacy. In particular, the decision to keep divisions ethnically separated is
evidence that Himmler and his colleagues realized that legitimacy could be an issue
in maintaining military resilience. In fact, Hitler commented directly on the matter
in a 1945 conversation. "After all, why should they still fight? They are far from
their homeland," he said. "If one had them for six or ten years and controlled their
homelands as the old monarchy did, they would naturally become good soldiers.
But if one gets them when their homelands lie somewhere over there-why should
they be expected to fight?" 70
A consistent pattern emerges among those historians who have studied the
battle record of foreign SS divisions: these divisions were not resilient, even in
similar battle conditions and given similar training and organizational structure as
other SS units. Stein is withering in his views of the eastern foreign legions' utility.
"The eastern SS-numerically many times larger than the western SS-was, with
the exception of the three Baltic divisions, nearly useless in regular warfare... [They],
with very few exceptions, seem to have been more of a liability than an asset." The
68. Degrelle was a prominent Rexist-the Belgian fascist movement-and has written a
disturbingly enthusiastic account of his service: Lon Degrelle, Campaign in Russia: The Waffen SS
on the Eastern Front, (Torrance: Institute for Historical Review, 1985). Another account is Eddy
de Bruyne and Marc Rikmenspoel, For Rex and For Belgium: Lion Degrelle and Walloon Political &
Military Collboration, 1940-1945 (Solihull: Helion, 2004).
69. Estes, European Anabasis, ch. 3 and ch. 5.
70. Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 195.
western legions had scattered successes, perpetuated, Stein argues, by a sense that
there was no return to their homelands, except perhaps to be tried for treason. In a
striking demonstration of resilience, the steadfast final defenders of Berlin, even
after Hitler's death, included Danes, Norwegians, French, and Latvians.7" Wegner is
similarly critical of the foreign units' performance, focusing on the frequency of
desertion and the instances where eastern European formations "fail[ed] completely
in combat." Through an analysis of Knight's Crosses, awarded to SS members for
bravery, Wegner argues that the classical, German divisions consistently
outperformed the newer divisions, and that the disproportion of awards must at
least be partially attributed to military effectiveness, including resilience, not
difference in combat situations, troop strength, or award bias.72 Estes, focused only
on the Western volunteers, is slightly more sympathetic to the foreign legions' battle
resilience, arguing that legions "spanned a wide range of quality," with some-
particularly larger ones like the Wiking and Spanish divisions in the Wehrmacht-
performing satisfactorily.7 John Keegan concludes that the non-multiethnic foreign
SS divisions were "too poorly motivated to count for anything in events of the scale
in which they found themselves involved," and attributes the occasional resilience of
Latvian and Estonian divisions to "fighting in the defence of their own
homelands." 74
The Case of Latvia
The military resilience that did exist can be explained through the wholesale
theory, as demonstrated by the Latvian legion. Many of the foreign legions, even
71. Stein, The Waffen SS, pp. 164, 193, 287-8.
72. Wegner, The Waffen-SS, pp. 311-2
73. Estes, European Anabasis, ch. 6.
74. Keegan, Waffen SS, p. 143.
while fighting under Nazi command as part of the Wehrmacht, maintained at least
some proto-nationalist sense of identity, responsible for what little legitimacy
remained. In particular, this was the case with the Latvian units, which included
roughly 30,000 soldiers, mostly drafted and formed into the 15th and 19th Waffen SS
divisions.75 The Baltic soldiers initially performed better than most eastern European
troops, but they did not share in the bulk of Nazi ideology. Without a prevalent
national socialist party in Latvia, racism and ideology do not appear to be significant
motivations for their combat on the eastern front. Instead, fear of a return to Soviet
rule-under which Latvia had been given even less sovereignty than Nazi
occupation, which at least permitted a puppet government led by locals-appears to
have been the primary motivation. Perceptions of legitimacy were higher for the
Baltic soldiers than for some of the other foreign legions, but not because they saw
the German government as legitimate. Rather, they believed they were fighting in
the defense of Latvian "independence" and legitimacy-in ethnically separated
divisions that maintained significant autonomy from the German troops.
As a result, congruent with the second and third empirical predictions in the
first chapter, Latvian legion fighting resilience declined significantly in 1944,
concurrent with the increased implausibility that Latvia could prevent Soviet
occupation. A legitimation crisis occurred when Soviet troops finally overran Nazi
troops and entered Latvia. Though the divisions had been resilient up until that
point-suggesting that retail factors such as training are inadequate to explain the
change-the occupation resulted in a series of December 1944 mutinies by the 19th.
The 20th Division, comprised of Estonians facing a similar fate, fared similarly: it was
reliable until Soviet occupation became inevitable, and it disintegrated when
75. Inesis Feldmanis and Kdrlis Kangeris, "The Volunteer SS Legion in Latvia," Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, <http://www.am.gov.lv/en/latvia/history/legion/>, accessed
July 3, 2008.
deployed into combat in Silesia in early 1945.76 Consistent with a wholesale
explanation's fourth prediction, related to written diaries and letters, records of
postal censors reveal that Latvian troops regarded their combat with German troops
as primarily designed to defend Latvia from further Soviet occupation. The 15th
Division's commander, Oberfthrer Adolf Ax, acknowledged this in a January 1945
report:
"They are first and foremost Latvians. They want a sustainable Latvian nation
state. Forced to choose between Germany and Russia, they have chosen
Germany, because they seek co-operation with western civilization. The rule
of the Germans seems to them to be the lesser two evils. Latvia's occupation
deepened hatred of Russia. They consider the fight against Russia to be their
national duty."77
Indeed, because of the lack of effective ties between such divisions and the Nazi
cause, the Nuremberg military tribunals specifically ruled out charges against
conscripted Waffen SS members, including the vast majority of Latvian soldiers.78 As
instructive as the Latvian case is, Clausewitz's notion that the defense is generally
easier than the offense may go some way to explain it. However, the eastern front
can rarely be analyzed so neatly, and the perceived difference between defense and
offense appears to have strongly affected soldiers' views of the legitimacy of their
struggle.
The evidence on the relative legitimacy and resilience of unit types is
summarized in Table 1, which shows that the two variables covary across the types
of German units. As described in the introduction, resilience can be assessed
primarily through two types of data, both cited previously in this section. The first is
objective data indicating disintegration-desertion rates, prominent defections, and
76. Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 194.
77. Quoted in Feldmanis and Kangeris, "The Volunteer SS Legion in Latvia."
78. Feldmanis and Kangeris, "The Volunteer SS Legion in Latvia."
military court-martials. The second takes the form of a more holistic assessment
based on military histories, including scholars' evaluations of how units held
together relative to expectation.
Table 1. Resilience and Legitimacy of German Wehrmacht Units
UNIT TYPE RESILIENCE LEGITIMACY
German SS High High (heavily
indoctrinated into Nazi
ideology)
Multiethnic SS Medium (high resilience Medium (constituted
e.g., SS Wiking early on diminished over earlier so contained more
course of war) volunteers than conscripts;
inclusion of Reichsdeutsche
meant that overall
perception of legitimacy
would average higher)
Western Volunteer Medium-Low (higher Medium-Low (tended to
e.g., Walloons, Spanish resilience evidenced by be motivated by leaders
Spanish divisions early on, with nationalist sentiments
but ultimately and ideological sympathy
disintegrated) to the spread of Nazism)
Eastern Conscript SS Low (generally poorly Low (little ideological
e.g., 19th Waffen committed and prone to solidarity with the Nazis,
Grenadier (2nd Latvian) disintegration except in except for anti-Soviet
defense of homeland motivations)
against Soviet incursions)
COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LACK OF RESILIENCE
A variety of factors may have contributed to the apparent disintegration of
these units: conscription and low barriers to recruitment, battle conditions, poor
training, ethnic tensions, and illegitimacy. With the exception of wholesale
explanations, based on relative perceptions of legitimacy, most do not hold up under
scrutiny. The retail concept of small-unit cohesion does not appear to have much
explanatory power on the eastern front, strongly weakening HR2. The high casualty
rate, frequent replacement of troops, and repeated splitting and reorganizing of
divisions on that front meant that the "primary groups" which Shils and Janowitz
focus on would have disintegrated by the time the German army was fighting the
hardest.79 For the German troops fighting the Soviets, the primary motivations for
what cohesion was maintained were a combination of racial hatred and ideology-
wholesale factors-alongside extreme coercive methods, including extrajudicial
punishment for cowardice. Moreover, should punishment not occur at the hands of
the Germans, surrender to or capture by Soviet troops was a likely death sentence.
However, even these coercive incentives to fight proved insufficient in the final
measure to preclude disintegration.8 0
Explanations that focus on material factors-the raw quality of foreign troops,
the provision of training, and the increasingly tenuous military balance-are not
satisfying because they do not explain the overwhelming difference between
German and non-German military resilience. It is true that as the war proceeded,
manpower needs resulted in conscription, lowered physical standards, and a
shortened training period; it is also true that the lowest-numbered and thus earliest-
created Waffen SS divisions tended to hold together better than the younger
divisions.81 Still, even seasoned recruits-those with past military expertise, who
entered early enough to go through full SS training-who were not natively
German tended to lose their resilience. The Freikorps Danmark included 1000 Danish
volunteers, of whom at least 40% had prior military service; in summer 1942,
fighting with the SS Totenkopf, they were specially cited by the Germans for their
effectiveness, killing 1736 enemies and capturing 103. But disintegration followed:
79. This argument is fleshed out in great detail in Bartov, Hitler's Army, p. 30-38. See also Fritz,
"'We are Trying...to Change the Face of the World'"
80. Bartov, Hitler's Army, p. 97-102
81. Wegner, The Waffen-SS, pp. 310, 312
the majority of them quickly quit, only to be replaced by the Latvian legion by
February 1943, less than a year after joining.82 Moreover, even with German defeat
nearing in 1944 and 1945, many Wehrmacht and SS divisions remained resilient.
Challenging battle conditions are thus insufficient to fully explain foreign legions'
military ineffectiveness. If anything, it seems German high command tended to use
foreign legions in the least challenging possible battle situations, where
disintegration still occurred. This selection bias actually strengthens the evidence in
favor of a legitimacy-based explanation and hypothesis HW2. An explanation for
declining military resilience based simply on bandwagoning is similarly
unsatisfactory, since units were not joining the winning side-in fact, they were
risking death at the hands of Soviet captors and occupation of their homelands by
Soviet forces in surrendering, not hoping to take part in the victor's spoils.
Harder to disprove are explanations based on the multiethnic nature of the
fighting forces. When foreign soldiers' presence was more diffuse, as in the
multiethnic and primarily Scandinavian SS Wiking, resilience was higher. Native
German soldiers were included in the ranks which could have made overall
legitimacy higher. By contrast, most of the non-multiethnic foreign legions tended
to maintain mixed loyalties, also seeing themselves as fighting for national pride.
Minister-President of Norway Vidkun Quisling, notorious for rallying Norwegian
soldiers to the Nazi cause, was at least in part making a political play for Norwegian
power in a German Reich which he saw as inevitable; a Norwegian legion would
provide the basis for a standing Norwegian army."8 Moreover, Germans were often
quite hostile to foreign recruits. Language tensions were prevalent; foreign leaders
82. Estes, European Anabasis, ch. 2.
83. Estes, European Anabasis, ch. 2, para. 42.
were frequently fired and replaced; and the Germans had a tendency to arbitrarily
extend service dates for volunteers.8 4 Likewise, explanations that see military
disintegration as the result of ethnic tensions are difficult to rule out, because they
are covariant with legitimacy arguments. Foreign legions that were not ethnically
mixed had two competing sources of legitimacy: the Germans and their own
national party. Anecdotal evidence suggests that nationalist pride and even national
defense, rather than a belief in Nazi ideology or the German Reich, was the strongest
factor in motivating commitment in combat. Wegner writes:
"Foreign volunteers were motivated to fight for different reasons than their
Reich-German counterparts. The result of this was that often their
deployment could only occur in certain areas and only against certain
enemies. In so far as these volunteers fought for the independence of their
native countries-or at least for what they considered their 'independence'-
their combat readiness dissipated the moment their homelands were overrun
by the enemy. These and similar difficulties considerably reduced the military
quality of those units."85
This helps explain the high-profile role played by nationalist leaders like Quisling
and Degrelle, who convinced soldiers under their command that national pride and
power could only be enhanced by serving the Nazi military.
By and large, the relative perceptions of the legitimacy of Wehrmacht
engagements appear to covary neatly with the military resilience of the various
Waffen SS divisions, in congruence with Hw1 . The earliest constituted divisions,
comprised primarily of German soldiers, fought effectively until the end. The
divisions of Western European volunteers were moderately effective; they chose to
fight out of some combination of the belief that the German Reich was itself
legitimate and out of a sense of national legitimacy-a desire to ensure that their
84. Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 154, p. 158
85. Wegner, The Waffen-SS, p. 311.
country would play an important role in the new pan-European system. Even so,
their resilience eroded as German chances eroded, which is consistent with the
theory's predictions-the shared sense of purpose no longer seemed a plausible
motivation. The non-multiethnic divisions of Eastern European conscripts were the
least effective; where they were effectual, they had a sense that they were defending
the remaining legitimacy and independence of their regime from invading Soviets.
Retail theories of resilience are not capable of generating specific predictions to
predict the varying resilience the conscripts, whose resilience varies almost
exclusively along legitimacy lines. However, retail theories may have had some
explanatory power for the western European volunteers, who had not only higher
legitimacy, but also used that legitimacy to bolster their group identity, which could
have led to small-unit cohesion and cast doubt on Hw2. Moreover, Clausewitz's
principle that the defense is generally easier than the offense may be a viable
competing explanation, and is not fully tested here: still, it should be noted that it
generates less clear predictions than the wholesale theory, since it is difficult to
determine the nature of each engagement on a granular level on a front as fluid as
the eastern front.
3. The Yugoslav People's Army and Yugoslav Army, 1991-2001
The series of wars between the former republics of Yugoslavia between 1991 and
2001 offer a useful laboratory for exploring the effects of legitimacy on military
resilience. The ethnic basis of the conflicts meant that legitimacy was continually in
question as national units broke off and reshaped themselves. Delegitimation
occurred as Yugoslavia moved from a tight federal coalition, as it had been under
Josip Tito for nearly four decades until his death in 1980, towards increasingly
independent, nationalistic regions. The secession of states in 1990s was the result of
a failure to solve this legitimacy crisis at the federal level. Slobodan Milosevic's
power grab came in the vacuum left by a failing collective leadership system, where
the presidency of Yugoslavia was meant to rotate among the member states. In place
of a federation, five separate environments emerged-multiethnic Bosnia-
Herzegovina and nationalistic Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia (including Kosovo,
Vojvodina, and Montenegro), and Macedonia-with Milosevic's parliamentary tricks
ensuring that the power was increasingly concentrated in Serbia. Rising fears of civil
war in the late 1980s gave way to all-out conflict with Slovenia's and Croatia's
attempts to secede in 1991. Milosevic stated that secession was only permissible if
Serbia maintained control of Serb-inhabited portions of the provinces-an
incitement to war because the fluidity of ethnic borders made this demand
unrealistic. Fighting continued with the secession of Bosnia in 1992, ultimately
prompting NATO's intervention. Though the federation had ceased to exist, the
region had not seen the end of conflict, with the eruption of the war in Kosovo in
the second half of the 1990s.86
86. A (rare) nonpartisan version of the history, as well as the argument that a legitimation crisis
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This chapter argues that evidence from the Yugoslav case supports Hwl, the
hypothesis that legitimacy generates military resilience. This chapter uses a
longitudinal method of difference, comparing the performance of the Yugoslav
People's Army (JNA) before and after its reconstitution as a Serbian army. The JNA
suffered mass desertion by soldiers and officers, as well as other forms of
disintegration, during wars with the seceding provinces of Croatia and Slovenia. This
appears to be explained in large part by the fact that there was no legitimate regime
tied to the JNA, because the JNA maintained unusual political autonomy, because
the pan-Yugoslav federation it had been assembled for was crumbling, and because
it was seen as a Serbian puppet by those of non-Serb ethnicity. The JNA had been
created around a fiction of a federated Yugoslavia, held together by communist
ideology and requiring protection from external forces, but the fiction no longer
stood up as the military threats came from within rather than without. By contrast,
the much smaller, poorer, less trained Croatian and Slovenian remained highly
resilient in battle, in part because soldiers there had newly legitimizing regimes and
a burgeoning sense of nationalism to motivate them. That provides very strong
support for the hypothesis that compares retail and wholesale sources of resilience,
Hw2. The test case then offers a second data point for comparison: the JNA was
reconstituted in 1992 as a largely Serb army for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Tied thusly to a regime that many found worth fighting for, it held together against
vastly superior NATO firepower, with limited desertions or other evidence of low
resilience. However, the second component of the case provides a relatively weaker
test because the clash with NATO did not include a ground war as in the first case,
meaning the second war required less resilience.
Westview Press, 2002), p. 1-77. See also Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building
and Legitimation, 1918-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006).
THE JNA AND THE SERBS
In 1991, when war with Croatia and Slovenia broke out, the federal state's
military power was concentrated in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), then one of
the largest armies in Europe. Its resources included 205,000 active-duty personnel,
1,150 battle tanks (and 700 older ones in storage), 500 armored personnel carriers,
2,000 pieces of artillery, nearly 500 fixed-wing combat aircraft, and 165 combat
helicopters-compared with 34,000 lightly armed police and militia in Croatia87 and
20,000 relatively untrained soldiers readily available to Slovenia. The JNA's troop
strength included a significant number-estimated at 110,000-of conscripts from
Yugoslav ethnic groups, including Croats and Slovenians. 88 Despite the public focus
on the genocide and war crimes which resulted from the conflict, the conflict with
Croatia was largely traditional in nature, with the JNA's strategy dominated by
heavy regular units that could consolidate control of territory, helicopters that could
back up ground combat, and naval units that could blockade arms imports.89 In
addition to its vastly superior firepower, the army had unusual political rights and
independence within the federation. It was represented in national government
bodies as if it were an autonomous province and controlled its own hardline
communist party, which the JNA had founded in response to the increasing
democratization in Yugoslav provinces. 90
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Despite the fact that the JNA, and particularly its officers, were primarily
Serb, the army's purpose had not solidified around the idea of Serbian nationalism.
Indeed, by and large most officers' primary goal remained a centralized, communist
Yugoslavia, not a "Greater Serbia." 9' The JNA had been organized around the notion
of a single Yugoslav nation for decades beginning with Tito. The secession of Croatia
and Slovenia, of course, belied this long-held notion that Yugoslavia's enemies were
external. This inconsistency between the stated goal and the effect of such a goal-
supporting Serbia alone against other secessionist provinces-helps explain the
shock to the JNA's sense of legitimacy. The JNA began to take on a distinctly Serb
ethnicity: commanders fired Slovenian and Croatian officers and promoted Serbs in
their place, and drafting of non-Serbs had largely ceased by the middle of 1991; by
the end of 1991, the JNA was nine-tenths Serb. The JNA also became increasingly
dependent on the Serbian government for enforcing its draft and providing its
funding. 92 The JNA also moved to confiscate Slovenian and Croat weapons, and
trained non-JNA paramilitary units in Croatia for anti-secessionist combat. 93
Attempts by Slovenian and Croatian members of the federal government to reign in
the army or to eliminate non-Serbian funding of the JNA failed. 94 Part of the JNA's
motivation in fighting, some believe, was to maintain army autonomy, particularly
in advance of threats to fire top Serb officers, made by the Croatian who was next
set to take on the Yugoslav presidency. 95
Despite its vastly superior firepower, the JNA nearly disintegrated in combat
operations. "The JNA was a far less formidable fighting force than most had
91. Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 302.
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expected it to be," writes Norman Cigar. 96 Its inability to decisively win at first gave
Croatia time to organize and build up a 200,000-man army, and ultimately
stalemate the JNA. 97 A ceasefire was possible in part because a reversal of military
fortunes seemed most likely if the war continued.9" Both active and passive
disintegration was common in the JNA's ranks, largely along ethnic lines. Draft-
dodging was widespread, with only two draftees showing up out of 3,000 in one
city; some have estimated that 15,000 avoided the draft, while tens of thousands
more moved away to avoid serving. 99 Many refused to serve past the 45 required
days; 2,600 reservists deserted in one single action; and it was difficult for
commanders to get anyone to serve on the front lines. Non-Serb officers defected to
the Croatian side; dozens of Serb Air Force officers defected to Croatia because they
had Croatian wives. Seceding Slovenia used the legitimacy garnered by its
declaration of independence and associated nationalism to ask Slovenian troops to
desert; it recalled troops from the JNA the same day it announced its secession.'0 0
Within days of combat, Slovenian officials announced that they had captured 500
Yugoslav soldiers, including 65 officers, along with another 250 deserters. The JNA's
air force commander resigned unexpectedly before fighting began; and the
commander of Slovenian air space, Colonel Drago Brencic, resigned the day after
fighting began. "' A high-ranking JNA naval officer committed suicide, leaving a
note that attributed his decision to his Croat roots.'0 2 In response to the ongoing
96. Cigar, "Serbo-Croatian War," p. 298.
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disintegration, most prevalent among conscripts, the JNA had to form units
comprised solely of officers and volunteers to serve in the hardest battle situations.'0 3
The JNA had been infused with the idea of protecting a federated Yugoslavia
from external threats; the situation that faced it was not congruent with this sense of
purpose. This helped create the legitimacy crisis affecting the JNA. 0 4 It was no
longer clear on behalf of which regime's legitimacy it was fighting: the maintenance
of the original Yugoslav state, or a Serb-dominated state. In short, the previous
regime-the idea of a federated Yugoslavia-had been delegitimated. However,
unlike in the secessionist provinces, where a democratization process had created a
new sense of legitimacy, no new idea of government had been accepted by the
people. This left it unclear what the JNA's soldiers were fighting for, a fact
specifically named as a concern by many reservists.'0 5 Moreover, the JNA's Serb
loyalties-whether intentional or simply the inevitable result of opposing
secession-proved problematic in maintaining loyalty among non-Serbs, who saw
the army as legitimate only for those it seemed to represent, the Serbs. But the army
had not explicitly reshaped its identity and rhetoric around a Serbian nationalist
cause. Finally, the military's high degree of political autonomy allowed it to remain
arbitrarily disconnected from any other actor-and thus from any source of
legitimacy-in the disintegrating federation.
Sources of military disintegration and non-resilience other than illegitimacy
do not adequately explain the outcomes in this case. Lack of small-unit cohesion is
not a sufficient explanation for why the poor resilience was seen primarily among
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those of particular nationalities. If anything, small-unit cohesion likely made it
easier for entire groups of non-Serbs to desert together. Differences in training and
experience are also inadequate as explanations. Even senior officers defected or
deserted. Moreover, in Croatia, where soldiers were less armed and possibly less
trained (at least in the form they were now fighting in), the military outperformed
expectations and showed unusual resilience under high pressure.'0 6 This is
consistent with the theory's prediction of resilience for troops serving in the
defensive, in support of a clearly defined regime that had legitimacy-due to
ongoing democratization, the emergence of nationalism, and shared ethnicity.
RECONSTITUTED AS THE YUGOSLAV ARMY
This test case offers a second benefit: in the wake of its poor performance in
the Slovenian and Croatian wars, the JNA was abandoned and reconstituted as the
Yugoslav Army (VJ). This new force was nearly entirely ethnically Serbian and
tightly controlled by the Serbian government, which dominated the new Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (which also contained Montenegro). In May 1992, many
officers, including 38 generals, were retired, with some tried for incompetence and
treason; this purge ensured that the army's loyalty would be to the cause of Serbian
nationalism, rather than to a pan-Yugoslav communist ideal. One army officer called
on personnel to "love, above all else, their unit, their army, and their homeland-
Serbia and Montenegro."' 7 The army, of course, retained much of the same
equipment, personnel, and doctrine as before. As such, it offers a useful test-similar
in most respects except for the study variable-for how relegitimation of the regime
106. Cigar, ......................Serbo-Croatian War," p. 319.
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being served affects resilience.
This reconstituted army held up very well in subsequent combat, even
though it was smaller and more poorly funded than it had been as a pan-Yugoslav
army. In its war in Kosovo, it was severely underequipped compared to NATO, with
defense budgets 300 times that of Yugoslavia. Conflict against NATO thus required
to be willing to suffer in order to inflict punishment on the invader sufficient for
deterrence, by reducing the marginal benefit of a ground attack.'0 s However, as the
war with NATO never turned into a full-scale ground attack, this component of the
case does not provide as hard of a test for the wholesale theory as the early Yugoslav
wars. (Further research might examine Serbian counterinsurgency efforts and
ground conflict against non-NATO forces during this same time period.) The VJ was
effective prior to NATO's intervention, and continued to hold up well after air
strikes began. Coordinated tactical measures were used to reduce the efficacy of
NATO bombing, including tracking of U.S. stealth aircraft, cluttering missile
guidance system with radar reflections off of farm machinery, building dummy
objectives and fake tanks, and flying low combat missions over Kosovo that were
undetectable by NATO AWACS. 1' 0 9 Such cooperative methods require active
commitment by soldiers, a component of resilience. The Yugoslav Army did not
collapse quickly, as repeatedly predicted by NATO commanders."0 The ability to
garner such sacrifice is even more striking given the difficulty acknowledged by the
VJ air force commander in paying sufficient salaries for officers; he specifically
attributed the willingness of officers to continue fighting to legitimacy-in particular
108. See Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo," International Security, vol. 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000),
pp. 49-50.
109. "Tactics Employed by the Yugoslav Army to Limit NATO Air Strikes Effectiveness," Associated
Press, November 18, 2002
110. See, e.g., Robert Burns, "Milosevic's Troops Running Low on Fuel, Pentagon Says," Associated
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a sense of patriotism and constitutional duty."'
The most tangible data point evidencing non-resilience in the JNA was
desertion and disintegration; now, defections were highly limited compared to the
1991 epidemic. The majority of deserters were from Montenegro, which was largely
resistant to Serb aggression in Kosovo." 2 This poses no difficulty for a legitimacy-
based theory of resilience. Moreover, the few desertions that did occur were
primarily late in the war, only after NATO bombing began, threats of a NATO
ground war loomed large, and resistance seemed increasingly futile."3 Though
played up by NATO spokespeople, the desertions were not seen as particularly
crippling: since they involved only reservists, not regular troops, the troops affected
were primarily support personnel including drivers. Given the unlikelihood of a full-
scale ground war, a smaller military-comprised primarily of the volunteer
professionals who increasingly dominated the Yugoslav Army and were not part of
the defections-was not seen as a risk to overall military effectiveness by military
analysts at the time."14 The increased legitimacy of the reconstituted Yugoslav
Army-specifically, that it was tied to a regime of which there was a single, shared
conception and an ethnonationalist desire to protect-seems to have helped hold it
together. This is in stark contrast to its prior incarnation fighting on behalf of the
defunct, delegitimized concept of a Yugoslav state. However, relatively limited
English sources makes it difficult to check for all of Hwl's predictions at the unit
level.
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113. "Serbian Troops Desert as NATO Bombs Hit Morale," Financial Times, May 20, 1999. Yugoslav
Foreign Ministry spokespeople denied the desertions, claiming the men in question were
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Moderate Leaders," Associated Press, May 21, 1999.
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4. Conclusion
Militaries will tend to disintegrate and lose their resilience as they become
disentangled from the regimes they serve. A sense of legitimacy provides an effective
link between a regime and its armed forces; that shared sense of purpose enhances
military resilience. Legitimacy may dissolve in a number of ways: conquest and
empire (as in our World War II case), fragmentation and disintegration caused by
nationalism (as in Yugoslavia), or the delegitimization of a government (as in a
failed state). In such cases, soldiers lose motivation as their shared purpose declines.
The idea goes back to Clausewitz's notion that war is "simply a continuation of
political intercourse, with the addition of other means.""5 Devoid of an effective link
to a regime perceived as legitimate, the purposiveness of war fades, along with
soldiers' willingness to sacrifice themselves in conflict. Throughout modern history,
developed states and their militaries have emerged together and mutually
constituted each other. Waging war leads to creating states, which in turn require
war-making capabilities. Fragmentation and conquest interrupt and reverse this
process-frequently destroying or converting a regime without concurrent
substantive changes to the armed forces.
In modern warfare, soldiers' commitment to battle is crucial. This goes
beyond the mere avoidance of desertion and disintegration, though both our case
studies have demonstrated how a political situation may make these likely at great
expense to military effectiveness. Modern warfare also requires small units to
operate relatively independently, thus requiring not just passive but active resilience
to be truly militarily effective. In both the case of the Waffen-SS and of the JNA,
115. Von Clausewitz, On War, p. 605. He continues: "War cannot be divorced from political life; and
whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements
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military success was seriously hampered by instances where even trained troops
would enter battle and, despite not deserting or surrendering, provide commitment
seriously lower than expected levels.
For statesmen, this means that attention must be paid to how military
resilience can be enhanced following a shock to legitimacy. Several methods might
be used to create greater resilience in the absence of a perception by soldiers that
their regime or cause is inherently worth fighting for. Retail factors may provide a
basic glue against unit disintegration, but may at times fail and may never induce
positive commitment. Similarly, methods involving coercion may never produce
resilience in its positive sense. For instance, conscription might be broadened
significantly beyond desired force strength, on the assumption that a certain
percentage of troops will desert. Military discipline-from a regular code of military
justice up to extremely harsh, extrajudicial executions of those who may desert-
can be applied, to minimize the expected value of resistance to a soldier.
Significantly higher salaries might be paid to increase the attractiveness of
compliance. Though such methods-conscription and military discipline-were
employed by organizers of the Waffen SS, active sacrifice was scarcely seen among
those who did not believe they were fighting for a legitimate regime or cause.
The other option for statesmen is to decrease the need for either retail factors
or coercive methods by attempting to increase or reestablish legitimacy. This can
take a number of forms. First, one can attempt to avoid shocks that will tend to
disentangle such preexisting ties. For instance, in empire-building, some degree of
member-state autonomy can be maintained-thus allowing soldiers from the colony
to reserve a sense of loyalty to their original regime. Relatedly, inculcating a sense of
loyalty to a new regime among top officers of the old regime can suggest to lower-
ranked soldiers that the military continues to serve a legitimate regime. In World
War II, the units commanded by Vidkun Quisling showed remarkable resilience, in
part because Quisling entered with Norwegian nationalist credibility and framed
loyalty to the Nazi cause as loyalty to Norway. Finally, statesmen can seek to create
effective ties by bolstering patriotism and nationalism. Strategies for creating
nationalism include the creation of a shared culture through enhancing literacy,
teaching a shared history, and spreading ideology through mass media." 6 Such
methods may require a longer term commitment.
LESSONS FOR IRAQ?
Iraq reflects a case where a regime has experienced the kind of legitimacy
shock expected to depress resilience. Building resilience will require that policy-
makers shape a shared sense of purpose-or at least a shared sense of threat, which
implicitly suggests that a legitimate cause exists and needs defending. The Coalition
Provisional Authority's early decision in May 2003 to disband the Iraqi army has
come under heavy fire as a pivotal mistake by U.S. policy-makers."' The decision
has been seen as a key reason why devolving security responsibilities on the new
Iraqi army has proceeded more slowly than expected. Resilience appears to be low.
One of the battalions of the new army simply refused to fight in Fallujah in spring
2004."' In January 2007, Bush announced that Iraqi forces would control all 18
Iraqi provinces by November of that year, but as of April, they controlled only 9. In
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March 2008, the Pentagon said it had trained 197,000 soldiers, but 27,000-the
equivalent of two divisions, or 14% of the total army strength-went AWOL in
2007. Most recent estimates by Pentagon officials suggest that internal security
responsibility will not be fully devolved until 2012, and external security in 2018.1'9
The original CPA policy has also been held responsible for providing fodder for
insurgent forces, by depriving trained and armed soldiers of gainful employment.
Efforts to build a new Iraqi army have been largely disconnected from the
process of state-building, except insofar as both are led by the United States. Since it
is not yet clear what final state the Iraqi regime will take, there can be no effective
link between regime and military purpose. U.S. planning documents have focused
on the building of security forces as a challenge of training and equipping, rather
than as a challenge of state-building and the generation of legitimacy. The
reconstruction process appears to ignore the longstanding historical links in modern
society, operating in both directions, between military functions and state creation.
Moreover, if anything, the issue of legitimacy should be of unusual significance in
Iraq. A significant portion of the Iraqi military's task will be ensuring internal
security. Military experts have widely argued that counterinsurgency missions
require attention to legitimacy.'12 Internally, illegitimacy helps create the rationale
for an insurgency and a government weak enough to be vulnerable to one. Military
responses to that insurgency can in turn alienate civilians from government soldiers,
in turn strengthening the insurgency, which is fueled by support from the local
population, and thus further inflate subsequent military responses. This cycle of
endogeneity exacerbates the degree to which illegitimacy incites disintegration.
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If wholesale theories carry significant explanatory power, policy-makers in
Iraq need to foster links between the military and the idea of an emerging Iraqi
regime. Saying that an effective military is necessary merely to create conditions of
security in which a regime can form-as often seems the case 21-is insufficient.
Creating security forces to create security to create a regime reverses the progression
of state-building; it disentangles the mutual constitution of military and
government. A stable, loyal Iraqi army is not viable without a regime for it to serve;
such a military is likely destined to disintegrate or, worse, provide a security threat
to an eventual regime (i.e., a coup). At the moment, what resilience the Iraqi army
has can be attributed to successful leadership by U.S. Transition Teams, who are
generally in command on challenging assignments. 22
Absent a fully shaped regime, inculcating a sense of "Iraqi patriotism"-
attachment to the idea of a unified Iraq, whatever its form-is one alternative
strategy for ratcheting up the possibility of a resilient military. 23 The extent to which
this can be done is a matter for future research. However, creating a shared sense of
purpose and a shared sense of threat are likely to be crucial tasks for U.S. trainers.
Already, there is evidence that meshes with the elite-focused predictions of
wholesale theories, in particular the prediction that military leaders will attempt to
sell all activities as being in defense of legitimacy. U.S. policy-makers have clearly
and repeatedly emphasized the degree to which all internal threats are externally
generated, for instance in arguing that Iranian or "foreign Al Qaeda" influences are
responsible for the security problem and insurgency.
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January 5, 2006
OTHER CASES AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Several other cases present themselves as plausibly supporting wholesale
theories of military resilience. Research into letters and diaries written by soldiers on
both sides of the American Civil War has demonstrated that principled feelings
concerning slavery provided an important source of motivation.2 4 Counterfactual
research into the Warsaw Pact suggests that most member regimes were not likely to
have been resilient in the event of a Soviet offensive.2 5 Stalin increasingly turned to
nationalistic and patriotic messages, rather than focusing on communism, in the
early stages of World War II.126 The Army of the Republic of Vietnam could be an
example of a military fighting on behalf of a puppet regime; further research could
assess whether this is partly responsible for the low views of its military
performance. 27 As has been mentioned, the French army after the revolution
provides an obvious test case for further research. 28 The wholesale argument may
also have evidence from pre-modern warfare: Herodotus has argued that
mercenaries fought less hard than local soldiers in the Greco-Persian wars because
they were not fighting in defense of fatherland.2 9 The American Revolutionary War
was heavily ideologically infused and demonstrates unusual resilience by an
outmatched army. 30
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Aside from the rich set of additional test cases, further research might also use
a more robust research design. In particular, process-tracing could be employed,
using careful examination of diaries and letters of soldiers, as well as service and
military tribunal records. This method would help identify the degree to which
servicemen saw the legitimacy of the regime they served as a reason for resilience-
or that illegitimacy was truly a rationale for desertion. That helps avoid the obvious
pitfall of constructing just-so stories about the source of non-resilience. It would also
help deal with the alternative explanation from Clausewitz, largely bracketed by this
research design, that defense is easier than offense. Process tracing could also shed
light on the exact methods by which illegitimacy creates non-resilience: for instance,
what is the relative influence of officers versus enlisted troops in the disintegration
of a unit? Other research could also test the remaining hypotheses from the
introduction. Finally, policy-relevant research would investigate which strategies are
most successful at creating legitimacy, and what limitations exist on statesmen's
ability to manipulate their population's sense of legitimacy.
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